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of adoption might be denied to a child whose domicile is merely a
technical one established by operation of law and where his real contact is with another state. In cases where the child's domicile is
more than a mere technicality, it is evident that the state of his domicile has a real interest in the child's welfare and in any proceedings
which will affect his status. Under such circumstances an adoption
decree rendered in a state other than the child's domicile may be
justified on the theory that adoption is beneficial to the child and
consequently his domicile will cooperate.
In In re Adoption of Hildy McCoy the adoption was decreed

in a state to which the child had been brought in spite of court decrees from the state of her domicile. The state which was Hildy
McCoy's domicile of origin had made the child's mother her legal
custodian and had unequivocally disapproved the proposed adoption
upon ground of its policy declared by statute. Although Florida was
not required to give full faith and credit to the Massachusetts decrees,
comity between sovereigns and the social need for stability of personal status seem to require that the policy, laws and decrees of a
competent state should not be rendered nugatory unless evident and
serious considerations of the child's welfare demand it.

x
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS

Background
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 ' was considered unsatisfactory in curbing monopolies. Its prohibitions were general in
nature, 2 and courts interpreted it so as to stop monopolistic tenAencies only when monopoly was present or imminent. 3
STA-r. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
"As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality . . . comparable to

126
2

that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). "The prohibitions of the
Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision or of crystal clarity and
the Act itself did not define them. In consequence of the vagueness of its
language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content
to the statute. . .

."

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940).

See Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition,
4 LAW & CONTErM.

PROB. 301, 302-03 (1937).

See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 99 (1911) (dissenting opinion);
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, pt 1, at 125-26 (1955); Jackson &
3

Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 231, 242-49 (1938).
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In 1914 the Clayton Act 4 was passed to outlaw monopoly in its
incipiencyYr Although couched in rather general language, it did
prohibit certain specific practices where their effect ". . may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." 6 Among these practices were price discrimination between purchasers, leases and sales of goods which bind the
purchaser not to use goods of another supplier, acquisition of the
stock of one corporation by another, and interlocking directorates of
certain kinds of corporations. 7 The act provided for both government action 8 and private suits. 9 The Clayton Act, however, was not
considered adequate. Against charges of price discrimination it provided the defense of "good-faith meeting of competition," and exempted discounts based on the quantity of goods bought.10 Until
1929 the courts interpreted it as prohibiting only price-cutting that
reduced competition among "sellers," that is, between the price cutter
and its competitors.11 Even after the United States Supreme Court
construed this prohibition as including reduced competition among
"buyers," the customers of the "sellers," 12 the exemption of quantity
discounts provided a convenient and legal way to give advantageous
prices to the larger buyers,13 the very ones the act was intended to
in
curb. Furthermore, the required proof of injury to competition
4
general as a result of a discrimination in price was difficult.'
During the 'twenties and early 'thirties chain stores had phenomenal success. Their growth disturbed the advocates of a strong
antitrust policy, since their mass-buying power enabled them to receive preferential treatment from suppliers.'3 The lobbies of independent dealers' organizations actively campaigned for a law to
protect the small retailer against the competitive advantages of the
438 STAT. 730
5Transamerica

(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13, 13b-27 (1952).
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir.
1953), quoted vith approval in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592-93 (1957) ; S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
6 Clayton Act §§2, 3, 38 STAT. 730, 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 (1952).
Id. at 730-32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19.
8Id. at 734, 736, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25.
9Id. at 731, 737, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.
10 Id. at 730, 15 U:S.C. § 13(a); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC,
101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939). See H.R. REP.
No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936) ; S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1936); AusTiN, PRICE DIscRIMINATrioN 8 (1950).
II See National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733, 740 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924); Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923); Bayly, Four Years Under the RobinsonPatinan Act, 25 MiNx. L. REv. 131 (1941).
12

George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).

13 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, note 10 supra; National Biscuit
Co. v. FTC, note 11 supra; Bayly, note 11 supra.
14 See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
15 AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION

7-8 (1950).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 32

chains. 16 In answer to this and to a report 1 of the Federal Trade
Commission which characterized the chain store as adverse to the
economic good of the country, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 was
enacted.
The Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act was avowedly anti-chain store.
purpose was ".

.

Its

. to protect the independent merchant, the public

whom he serves and the manufacturer from whom he buys, from
exploitation by unfair competitors." I The principal means used was
an amendment 19 to the price discrimination provisions of the Clayton
Act. It broadened their scope so as to cover injury to individual
competitors as well as general injury to competition. 20 Furthermore,
instead of limiting liability to the discriminating party, it imposed
liability upon the person inducing or receiving the benefit of the discrimination in price if he knew that it was illegal when he induced or
received it.21 It provided that, in proceedings before the Federal
Trade Commission, once an otherwise unlawful discrimination is
shown the burden is upon the defendant to prove a justification under
the Act.2 2 The available defenses, too, were limited.

The exemption

for quantity discounts was confined to those reflecting the difference
in the seller's costs due to the differences in quantity.2 3 Thus the
discount, to be justifiable, had to be of direct economic advantage to
the seller's operation, not merely a coerced courtesy to his best
customers.2 4 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission was au16 Ibid. Indeed, it has been asserted that the bill introduced by Representative Patman was drafted by the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association.
See Rose, The Right of a Businessman to Lower the Price of His Goods,
4 VAND. L. Rnv. 221, 236-37 (1951) ; Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of
1936, 23 VA. L. REv. 140, 143 n.21 (1936).
11 Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1934).
is Preamble to H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), quoted in PATA N,
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 3 (1938).

1949 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
20H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936);

S. REP. No. 1502.
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936). See Adelman, Effective Competition and the
Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. RFv. 1289, 1334-35 (1948).
2149 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1952).
See Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); Massel & Gormley, Business Methods and
Antitrust Policy: The Automatic Canteen Case, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 361, 467
(1955).
2249 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
In actions brought by
the FTC it has been held that once the Commission proves the discrimination,
the respondent must prove a lack of injury to competition. See Samuel H.
Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) ;
Ostberg, The Meaning of the "Injury to Competition" Provision of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 32 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 26, 31-35 (1957). But see Auto-

matic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
23 See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 48 (1948).
24 For a general discussion of quantity discounts see Haslett, The Validity
of Quantity Discounts, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYmposIum 26 (1948).

1958 ]

NOTES

thorized to limit the quantity at which a discount would be allowed
wherever it finds that the purchasers of amounts above that quantity
are so few as to render the discount differential unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly. 25 The defense that the discrimination
in price resulted from differences in the grade or quality of the goods
sold was retained, as was the proviso that dealers may select their
own customers in bona fide transactions not in restraint of trade.26
Discrimination based on changing market conditions or marketability
of the goods sold was expressly recognized as a valid economic defense 27 as was a discrimination made in good faith to meet the equally
low lawful price of an actual competitor.2 8 However, certain practices were
considered economically indefensible and were made illegal
29
per se.

Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act '0is a penal provision
declaring certain practices in interstate commerce illegal and imposing
penalties for their violation. 31 Specifically, the section prohibits a
seller from knowingly discriminating between competing purchasers
by means of any discount, rebate, allowance or advertising charge in
the sale of goods of like grade, quality and quantity. Also prohibited
is price discrimination in sales in different parts of the country, or
sales at unreasonably low prices, for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. While no defenses are specified,
it would appear that any defense negating an intention to destroy
competition or eliminate a competitor is valid. Thus it would seem
that any defense valid under Section 2 of the Clayton Act might be
used. 32 Furthermore, since Section 3 prohibits discounts on sales of
2549 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952); B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
FTC, 134 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1955). The FTC has used this power very
seldom. See AUSTIN. PRIcE DISCRIMINATION 71 (1950); ELKOURI, TRADE
REGULATION 207 (1957); 16 C.F.R. §310.1 (Supp. 1957) (FTC order which
was held invalid in Goodrich case, supra.).
2649 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). See also Clayton Act
§2, 38 STAT. 730 (1914) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat
Co., 227 Fed. 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1915).
27 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). See Moore v. Meade
Service Co., 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951); Frederick W. Huber, Inc. v.
Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., 30 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
2849 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
Like the old proviso,
this is an absolute defense. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250-51
(1951). Unlike the old law, however, a price may be lowered only to ineet
the equally low laweful price of an actual competitor. Id. at 242.
2949 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1952) (brokerage commission
to buyer upon buyer's own purchases), Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1939); id. § 13(d), (e) (discriminating in
the furnishing of, or payment for, services or facilities by the buyer or seller),
Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946).
3049 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
31 It provides a penalty of not more than $5,000 fine or not more than one
year in prison, or both. Ibid.
32 In Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956), the court construed
§ 3 in the light of § 2(a), saying that "these sections are parts of the same
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goods of like grade, quality and quantity, the old quantity discount,

unjustified by lower costs, seems to be beyond the reach of Section 3.33

Treble Damages
Ideally, private treble damage actions are intended to supplement
the vigilance of the government's antitrust enforcement agencies with
that of the businessman himself.3 4 This action may be brought in a
federal district court 35 by any person 36 injured 3 in his business
or property by a violation of the antitrust laws. 3 8 The plaintiff's
burden of proof is alleviated, in many cases, by the provision that a
judgment against the defendant in a government action is prima facie
evidence in a subsequent private suit as to all issues determined
therein.3 9 The four-year statute of limitation on private suits is tolled
during the pendency of the government action and for a year there-

law and must be construed harmoniously." Id. at 15. See also Spencer v.
Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950) ("meeting. competition" held
valid defense under § 3 as well as under § 2(a)).
33 See Rose, The Right of a Businessman to Lower the Price of His Goods,
4 VAND. L. Rav. 221, 229 (1951).
34 Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893
(5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d
2, 4 (7th Cir. 1943). "In practice, [this] ...purpose has hardly been achieved,
since private suits generally are not brought until the government wins a suit
against a violator, after which the private plaintiff can not only take advantage
of section 5 of the Clayton Act, but can also rely on the successful legal
theory developed in the government's case. The great complexity and expense
of antitrust cases seems to prevent any pioneering in the field by private
plaintiffs, the proof of which is that the landmark cases in recent times have
not been treble damage suits." Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New
Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 363 (1954).
See also Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments
in the Treble Damage Suits, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1060-61 (1952).
3538 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
The jurisdiction of the
federal court, being derived from the statute, is not dependent upon the amount
in controversy or the status of the parties, but only upon the interstate character of the transactions. See Christian v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
7 F.2d 481, 483 (E.D. Ky. 1925). However, the courts will not initially take
jurisdiction if defendant is under a regulatory agency which may provide relief for parties injured by defendant's violations of the antitrust laws. See

Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
36 "Person" includes a state, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), and
a municipality, Chattanooga Foundry Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
The United States may recover actual damages for injury to "its business or
property." 69 STAT. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (Supp. IV, 1957).
37 The injury must be to the plaintiff; an injury to the general public is
not enough. Peller v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 942 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd, 227 F2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955).
3 Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines the "antitrust laws" as the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. 38 STAT. 730 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952).
s938 STAT. 73 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp IV, 1957).
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after, 40 thus increasing the likelihood of one
or more treble damage
41
suits after a successful government action.
To recover treble damages for violations of the Robinson-Patman
amendment to the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must prove that he was
injured as a result of defendant's unlawful price discrimination, which
42
also has at least a reasonable possibility of harming competition,
and either that one of the parties was engaged in interstate commerce,
or that interstate commerce was used to commit, or was impaired by,
the violation. 43 Actual, and not merely speculative, damages must be
proved,44 but absolute certainty is not required. 45 There is dispute
as to the proper measure of damages. 46 General damages, or the
amount of the unlawful discrimination, have been allowed in some
cases; at other times the courts require proof of 4the
actual financial
7
impairment of the plaintiff's competitive position.
From the legislative history of Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act it is clear that its purpose was to provide penal sanctions for the
type of discriminations forbidden by the remaining provisions of the
act.4 8 It was not drafted as part of the Robinson-Patman Act, but
49
came almost verbatim from a controversial Canadian penal statute.
It was introduced in the Senate as the Borah-Van Nuys amendment
and was added to the Act with little debate, apparently as a political
compromise.50 As a penal measure, however, it has been used only
Ibid.
41 See Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in
Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MicH. L. REv. 363 (1954) ; Antitrust Enforcement
by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suits,
61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1060 (1952).
40

42 See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). Reasonably possible injury
to competition need be proven only for violations of § 2(a), since §§ 2(c)-(e)
are per se offenses. See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMNlTrEE, REPORT ON THE
STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 191-92 (1955).
For a detailed discussion, see

Ostberg, The Meaning of the "Injury to Competition" Provision of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 32 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 26 (1957).
- Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
44 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d
846, 855 (8th Cir. 1952).
45 Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements Inc., 210 F.2d 86, 95 (10th Cir. 1954).
46 See Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in

Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 363, 406-11 (1952).

4 Compare Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988
(8th Cir. 1945) ; Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757
(1947) (dictum), with Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1957); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178
F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
4880 CONG. Rzc. 6346 (1936).
49 Criminal Code, 1953-54, 2 & 3 ELIZ. 2, c. 51, § 412 (Canada), the validity
of which was upheld in Attorney-General for British Columbia v. AttorneyGeneral for Canada, [1937] A.C. 368 (P.C.).
50 See McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States, 4 LAW &
CONTaEMP. PRoB. 273, 290 (1937) ; Rose, The Right of a Businessman to Lower
the Price of His Goods, 4 VANsD. L. Rnv. 221, 224-26 (1951).
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once, and then unsuccessfully.5 1 Most of the litigation of Section 3
has been in the field of treble damages, the question of its availability
for use in such
actions provoking a marked conflict among lower
52
federal courts.
When the Robinson-Patman Act was codified, the editors of the
United States Code, apparently inadvertently, included Section 3 as
a part of the Clayton Act, for violations of which treble damages may
be had.53 Since the section also dealt with antitrust matters, and
reasoning that it was the intent of Congress that treble damages
should be had for antitrust violations, the majority of the lower
courts held that it would support an action for treble damages.5 4
In order to resolve this conflict, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the companion cases of Nashville Milk
Co. v. Carnation Co.5 5 and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance."0 The
Nashville Milk Co. case was an action for treble damages for violation of the Section 3 prohibition of unreasonably low prices.5 7 In
a 5-4 decision the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint. The majority reasoned that an action for treble damages
is given by Section 4 of the Clayton Act for violations of the "antitrust
laws." 58 Section 1 defines "antitrust laws" as the Sherman Act,
the Wilson Tariff Act and the Clayton Act.5 9 To give rise to a
51 See Rose, supra note 50, at 228.
The Department of Justice attempted
to enforce § 3 in United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 89 F. Supp. 112 (N.D.
I1. 1949) (motion to dismiss denied). A verdict was returned for the defendant. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 3551.18.
52 The majority held that § 3 would support a treble damage action. Vance
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 239 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1956), re'd, 355 U.S. 389
(1958); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.
Cal. 1950); Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Con. 1950);
A. J. Goodman & Sons, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 892
(D. Mass. 1949); Atlantic Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. Tex.
1942). A few courts and many legal publications and law review articles were
contra, Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 238 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1956);
National Used Car Market Report v. National Auto Dealers Ass'n, 108 F.
Supp. 692, 694 (D.D.C. 1951) (dictum), reed on other grounds, 200 F.2d 359

(D.C. Cir. 1952); Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimihation Act-The
Meaning of Sections 1 and 3, 22 A.B.A.J. 593, 649 (1936); Hamilton &
Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price Discrimination: The Robinson-Patinan
Act, 22 WASH. U,L.Q. 153, 182 (1937) ; Legis., 50 HARV. L. REV. 106, 121-22

(1936) ; Comment, 55 MicH. L. REv. 845, 850-57 (1957) ; Legis., 85 U.

PA.

L. REV. 306, 312 (1937).

53 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952), with 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1934).
ville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., supra note 52, at 88-89.
r4 See note 52 supra.

See Nash-

55355 U.S. 373 (1958).

355 U.S. 389 (1958).
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, . . . to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low
prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
5838 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
59 Id. at 730, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952).
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treble-damage suit, therefore, Section 3 must be part of the Clayton
Act. Its codification as such is only prima facie evidence of the fact. 60
That part of the Robinson-Patman Act which amended Section 2 of
the Clayton Act was specified as an amendment, both on its face 61
and in the committee reports and debates in Congress. 62 Section 3
was not so specified, and a further investigation of these sources C3
led the Court to conclude that Congress meant to confine the utilization of the section to criminal suits brought by the Department of
Justice. Two of the three prohibitions of Section 3 are also bases
for private actions in Section 2 of the Clayton Act.64 The "unreasonably low prices" prohibition is of questionable constitutionality,
and Congress may have preferred not to put such a potentially troublesome weapon into private hands. 65
The dissent 60 argued that the legislative history of the Act emphasizes that penal sanctions are confined to Section 3, not that private
enforcement is excluded; that the interpretation of the codifiers should
be given great weight, and that since the Department of justice ap3, to disallow private actions is,
parently has never enforced Section
67
in effect, to repeal the section.
Conclusion
The Nashville Milk Co. and Safeway Stores, Inc. cases were
correctly decided. Treble damages are a potentially dangerous enforcement technique. Although the courts hold that they are not
penal in nature, 5 their effect upon a defendant is like that of a
penalty. They often afford large profits 09 to a complainant for another's violation of the law, and antitrust laws are, at best, vague. A
601 U.S.C. §204(a) (1952). See Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423,
426 (1943) (per curiam).
61 See 49 STAT. 1526 (1936).
62 See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); 80 CONG. REc. 3113
(1936).
63 See H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936); 80 CONG. REc.

9419, 9421 (1936).
64 Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1958).
65 Id. at 378-79 & n.7.
66

67

Id. at 383-88.

Proposed legislation would amend the Clayton Act so as to include the

Robinson-Patmdn Act as an "antitrust law," thereby allowing treble damage
actions for violations of § 3. H.R. 10243, H.R. 10251, S. 3079, 85th Cong.
2d Sess. (1958) (referred to Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary).
68 See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed.
574, 577 (2d Cir. 1916). See Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the AntiTrust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940). But see ArORNEY
GENERAL'S CO .ITTEE,

REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWs

379

(1955); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised
National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1139, 1209 (1952).
69 See Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments

in the Treble Danmage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1044 n.225, 1058-62 & nn.321-23
(1952).
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law imposing such heavy penalties for violation, enforceable by competitors who stand to gain greatly by the verdict, should be carefully
tailored to prevent abuse.
The third part of Section 3, the only part practically affected
by the Nashville Milk Co. decision, provides little in the way of an
objective test of legality. The Court expressly refrained from passing
on the question, raised by the District Court, of whether the sectiun
was so vague as to be unconstitutional.70 It would seem, however,
that whether a price is "unreasonably low" is usually dependent upon
economic factors not easily comprehended by the average jury, and
might be held to impose too unclear a standard of criminality.
The remaining causes of action for private suits, under Section 2
of the Clayton Act, are sufficient both to provide compensation for
persons injured by acts violative of the condemned discrimination,
and to act as a deterrent to future violations.

70

See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378 n.7 (1958)

